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J Chapter 5*
CENTRALIZATION AND THE 
TRANSFORMAHON OF 
PUBLIC EDUCATION
In 1892 John D. Rockefeller founded the University of Chicago and made 
William Rainey Harper its president. Two years later, in 1894, the Chi­
cago Civic Federation selected Harper the first chairman of its educational 
committee; the same year, the federation nominated Harper for appoint­
ment to the board of education. Two years later. Mayor Swift appointed 
him. Then, in January 1898, following representations from businessmen. 
Progressive reformers, and the Civic Federation, Harrison created a blue- 
ribbon Educational Commission to investigate and report on the state of 
public education in Chicago. Members of the commission then chose 
Harper as chairman.'
Exactly one year later, the commission reported to the mayor, rec­
ommending “radical” reform of the “largely defective” administrative 
structure of public education in Chicago. In particular, the commission 
found that the administrative structure, with its “large” board of 21 mem­
bers and 17 committees inefficient, subject to graft and corruption, and 
prone to unwarranted political influence or “pull.” The commission rec­
ommended that the board be reduced from 21 to ii members; that board 
members continue to be appointed by the mayor rather than popularly 
elected; that administrative and legislative functions be clearly differen­
tiated, with the administrative functions exercised by a highly paid super­
intendent acting as an educational “expert” with greatly enhanced powers 
and a six-year contract, and a business manager who would have “a free-
*Coauthored with Marjorie Murphy.
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dom similar to that of the executive head in any well-conducted business 
enterprise.” The superintendent alone would determine the course of 
study, hire all teachers, determine “efficiency,” and recommend promo­
tions. The commission concluded that “the established laws of business 
cannot be violated with impunity in the management of the professional 
details of our schools.
Prominent national educational figures praised the commission’s re­
port, but to the fledgling Chicago Teacher’s Federation (CTF), formed 
two years prior to protect teachers’ pensions, raise salaries, and to “study 
parliamentary law,” the Harper Report boded ill tidings.’ The commission 
had included no teachers, women, or labor figures; it had not consulted 
teachers; it had made no provision for tenure; it had recommended that 
the process of teacher training and certification be revised to include a 
college education; and although it had recommended creating a system of 
teacher councils, they were to be advisory only and to have no say in the 
design of school policy or in the administration of the school system. 
When Harper engineered the appointment of Benjamin Andrews, a men­
tor of Harper’s at Denison University, to the superintendency, and sup­
ported through the good offices of the leading expression of political 
progressivism in Chicago, the Civic Federation, a bill in the state legisla­
ture to institute the recommendations of the commission, the CTF feared 
that the material welfare and professional autonomy of Chicago’s teachers 
stood in jeopardy. The union quickly mobilized to contest Harper and the 
Civic Federation in Springfield. The battle lines between business and the 
“administrative progressives,” as David Tyack calls them, and the CTF 
were drawn, and remained so throughout the next three decades.'’
At an immediate political level, three issues pitted the business com­
munity, the board of education, and the administrative progressives 
against the CTF: (i) business domination of the board, (2) imposition of 
a centralized and hierarchical administration modeled upon corporate in­
dustry and nourished by the same ideological developments that nour­
ished political progressivism generally, and (3) the teachers’ conditions of 
employment. The conflicts generated by these differences were often char­
acterized by sharp expressions of class consciousness and antagonism, but 
the origins, character, and significance of these conflicts cannot be ade­
quately captured in terms of a simple categorical notion of “class politics.” 
Rather, the origins and significance of the centralization movement de­
rived from the common vision of class relations and institutional align­
ments shared by progressives in education and civic reform and the 
complicated relationship between centralization politics and complex pro­
cesses of class formation during the Progressive Era.
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The Politics of Centralization
When teachers founded the CTF in 1897, they were concerned with bread 
and butter issues—above all, salaries and pensions. Indeed, protection of 
their pensions against a proposed change in the state law regulating pen­
sions for public servants precipitated the establishment of the CTF in 
1897.' When the Civic Federation proposed a bill based on the recom­
mendations of the Flarper Commission (the Harper Bill) in Springfield in 
1899, the concerns of the CTF expanded from pensions and salaries to 
include teacher training, job security (entry, promotion, and tenure), and 
their professional rights and autonomy. Within a short time the leaders of 
the CTF articulated a philosophy of administrative structure and profes­
sional autonomy very different from that proposed by the administrative 
progressives.
To contest the Harper Bill, the CTF circulated a petition, gathered 
fifty' thousand names, enlisted the support of the Chicago Federation of 
Labor, and lobbied extensively in Sprin^eld. Margaret Haley, who with 
Catharine Goggin was at the time running for election to the top leader­
ship positions in the CTF, compared the teachers role under the Harper 
Bill with factor)' employees. “The teacher is the only person under the 
civil service law who has no right to trial before the Civil Service Com­
mission,” she argued. “Every other person from Superintendent to janitor 
has that right. We are given no more consideration than factory employees 
and our places will be dependent on the good will of the Principal and 
Assistant Superintendent.” In terms resonant with the radical republican 
idiom of antimonopolism, equal rights, and fear of class privilege, the 
CTF warned that if passed, the Harper Bill would give the superintendent 
“autocratic powers unknown to the Czar of Russia. The direct relation­
ship between the despotic power of Rockefeller—the greatest example of 
“one man power in American business”—and the feudal implications of 
the Harper Bill should escape no one.'’ Moreover, the Harper Commis­
sion’s recommendation that a college degree be made a prerequisite for 
entrance into teaching, thereby replacing the old apprenticeship system, 
outraged the teachers. Harper had impuned their cultural background 
(mainly working class) and their professional competence:
Uncouth and uncultured are terms which they freely apply to the unspecified 
element they desire to see eliminated from the schools. What constitutes culture 
thev do not define, nor what incompetence. A college degree, however, they would 
probably accept as a certificate of culture. With all due respect for a college de­
gree—there are many emergencies in the life of the public school teacher where it 
would be of considerable less value than the experience she has acquired during
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the four years usually spent in college. . . . To make it a condition of entrance to 
teaching or to lower the requirements in favor of those who hold a degree would 
be to put a premium on the conventional and the conventional is the last thing to 
rely on the problem of dealing with children.'
Teachers were not the only individuals upset. Members of the Chi­
cago Central Labor Council argued that “making a college education a 
requisite for the position as a teacher” would severely limit the ability of 
working-class women to enter teaching, still, around 1900, the principal 
avenue of social mobility and respectability for working-class daughters. 
The new procedures represented “an unjust discrimination against the 
children of the common people who, with few exceptions, find it impos­
sible to secure a college education, and who, for this reason, although 
qualified in all practical essentials, must give way to the college graduate.”* 
Two months later, after Andrews claimed that since schools had to teach 
morality, it was necessary that teachers had to be “properly” educated, 
another delegate to the Central Labor Council denounced Andrews as a 
“moral leper.” “He is the creature of Rockefeller and his purpose is to 
promote Rockefeller’s ideas. He talks about outsiders in the schools. The 
outsider he refers to is the child of the proletariat.”'’
The combined opposition of the CTF and the CFL blocked passage 
of the Harper Bill, much to the chagrin of Superintendent Andrews, 
Harper, and the Civic Federation. Andrews blamed the failure of the bill 
directly on the teachers “who protect mediocrity and incompetency.” The 
CTF, on the other hand, witnessed its membership soar to thirty-three 
hundred and confirmation of its political power in Chicago.
Defeated but not intimidated, Andrews decided to pursue the goals 
of the Harper Report indirectly, through administrative fiat. In June 1899 
he fired a woman music teacher and replaced her with a man as part of a 
“reorganization plan” without notifying the school management commit­
tee, nominally responsible for such decisions. A week later, Andrews again 
irritated the committee when he issued a memorandum requiring a college 
degree for admittance to principal examinations, another Harper innova­
tion. Immediately, school management committee members argued that 
they were not consulted and countermanded the memorandum. Neverthe­
less, Andrews was not without friends in higher places, for at the National 
Education Association (NEA) meeting that summer, Nicholas Murray 
Butler came to the aid of Andrews, angrily denouncing the teachers in 
Chicago as “revolutionist” and successfully sponsoring a resolution laud­
ing Andrews."
Buoyed by his support at the NEA, in the fall of 1899 Andrews
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continued to implement the recommendations of the Harper Bill through 
administrative fiat. He announced that all principals were to make reports 
on teachers, noting “their fidelity and consecration,” ability to govern, 
books they had read, and personal inquisitiveness. The teachers called it a 
police system “like in Russia.”'" In November Andrews proposed a plan 
of reorganization that included his own four-year tenure and a salary raise. 
The board refused. Andrews then rejected four principals recommended 
by the school management committee, and the committee ruled him out 
of order." The following day, board president Graham Harris announced 
he would accept Andrews’s resignation.'“^ Andrews refused to oblige, and 
continued to fight throughout the winter months of 1900 for the reorga­
nization of the administrative structure. The board frustrated each effort. 
In February newspapers announced that “President Harper, the Civic 
Federation and the members of the Superintendents’ Department of the 
NBA are about to fire a 13-inch gun in defense of‘one-man power’ in the 
Chicago Public Schools.’”' But Andrews had lost his will to fight; in 
March he took a vacation and upon his return resigned.
During the search for a new superintendent, the Civic Federation 
announced the formation of a Commission of One Hundred to study the 
“reorganization” of the school system and set up committees around each 
of the major recommendations of the Harper Report. Among others, 
Nicholas Murray Butler and Andrew Draper, president of the University 
of Illinois, addressed the Commission of One Hundred. Draper, like But­
ler, encouraged the federation to pursue administrative reform and to 
secure the reduction of the size of tiie school board and the appointment 
to it of men “representative of the business and property interests, as well 
as of the intelligence and genuine unselfishness of the city.”'" Meanwhile, 
the board appointed Edwin Cooley to succeed Andrews."’ Cooley entirely 
sympathized with Andrews’s objectives but proved to be far more adroit 
politically than his predecessor, actively seeking out the support of leading 
board members and the business community while introducing adminis­
trative reforms with considerable bureaucratic finesse.
Cooley first concentrated on gaining control over entry into the 
teaching force. At the time of his appointment, high school graduates 
entered teaching either through an apprenticeship system or through 
graduation from a two-year program at the Chicago Normal School (until 
1896, the Cook County Normal School). Upon completion of their ap­
prenticeship or graduation from the Chicago Normal School, local school 
committees of the board of education hired the teacher for a local neigh­
borhood school, very often the same neighborhood the teacher had grown 
up in, a situation highly suited to patronage politics and local control of
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neighborhood schools.'* Shortly after his appointment, Cooley acted to 
overturn the existing system and locate control of the hiring process in the 
superintendent’s office. At the beginning of the new school year, Cooley 
convinced a member of the board to introduce an “anti-puli’ regulation to 
prevent political influence in the hiring of teachers. In November the 
board approved the regulation. Under the provisions of the new rule, 
Cooley drew up a list of all personnel appointments and submitted it as a 
whole to the school management committee in June. Should any board 
member, alderman, or political person discuss with Cooley any individual 
teacher, Cooley would expose both the lobbyist and the teacher, placing 
that person on the ineligible list.'"
Next, Cooley turned to the system of promotions. At the time, prin­
cipals and local school committees controlled the promotions process^ 
primarily they evaluated teachers for their ability to govern and to teach. 
When a financial crisis hit the school system in late 1901, Cooley took the 
opportunity to announce the introduction of a “new promotional scheme” 
and “merit pay system” in which salaries were tied to secret “efficiency 
grades” or “ratings.” “Efficiency grades,” in turn, were to be measured in 
terms of professional attainments, systematic work and results in scholar­
ship, and “school interest”—cooperation with other teachers and with the 
principal as determined by the principal. Efficiency grades determined 
whether a teacher could then take a promotional examination to gain a 
salary^ increase. Erom these evaluations a teacher was graded from 95 to 
100 as “superior,” 90 to 94 as “excellent,” 80 to 89 as “good,” 70 to 79 
as fair, and below 70 as incompetent. The grades were kept secret “to 
avoid comparisons and to avoid political ^^pull.” The teachers were never 
notified of their exact grade and if they had attained above 80, they were 
simply told they were eligible to take a promotional examination. “The 
merit system,” Cooley claimed in unconscious irony, “will make teachers 
progressive, not time serv'ers.”“
With the antipull campaign in full swing and the new promotions 
scheme in place, Cooley turned to the transfer system. Normally, teachers 
transferred on the basis of seniority with the approval of the local school 
committee and the district superintendent. Cooley decided to “base trans­
fers according to ‘merit’ ” and the “needs of the entire system.” Teachers 
had no court of appeal; those who appealed to their district superinten­
dent, to board members, or their alderman Cooley accused of using pull."'
The CTE reacted with immediate hostility to Cooley’s proposals. The 
“efficiency ratings” failed “to take into account the qualities of soul and 
heart and mind, the really vital part, the character and personality of the 
teacher” and threatened to undermine collective solidarity. The new trans-
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fer system, on the other hand, would destroy the ability of teachers to 
teach in the school of their choice, often in neighborhoods where they 
had grown up. The CTF leadership decided to boycott Cooley’s propos­
als but the membership split: While many teachers would boycott the 
system, others felt they could not afford to, a simation that created consid­
erable conflict and “bitterness” among the teachers, and ineffective oppo­
sition. Not until 1905, with the appointment of the first Dunne board 
and the selection of Jane Addams to head the school management com­
mittee, did the teachers get their first real chance to force Cooley to retract
his promotions scheme.^’
Cooley’s antipull crusade and his new promotions and merit pay 
scheme won him immediate prestige and invitations to speak at the Mer­
chants Club, the Commercial Club, the Union League Club, and the Civic 
Federation, a prestige he used in mrn to ftirther centralize power in the 
superintendent’s office.’’ He engineered the reduction of the number of 
board committees, organized along district lines, from more than sixty to 
four on a city wide basis: school management, buildings and grounds 
finance, and compulsory education. In a series of moves, he gained control 
of the appointment of Normal School faculty, the admission of smdents 
and the general policy of the Normal School. To destroy the power of 
local superintendents and centralize power m his office, in 1902 Cooley 
reduced the number of district superintendents from fourteen to six, sig­
nificantly reduced their powers (e.g., over transfers, curriculum, and text­
books) created three new assistant superintendents in the head office to 
oversee day-to-day administration, and formed the six remaining district 
superintendents into an at-large board of superintendents. The next year, 
he codified the rules of the board of education, carefhlly delineating the 
prerogatives of the board and inserting those prerogatives of the superin- 
tendency outlined in the Harper Bill although not approved by the state 
legislamre. He began to refine cost per smdent categories in his annual 
reports, and in 1904 started publishing the Chicago Board of Education 
Bulletin. The contents of the Bulletin accurately reflected the more prosaic 
preoccupations of the administrative progressives: average school mem­
bership total cost of educational supplies, and average cost per pupil of 
supplies including chalk, crayons, erasers, drawing paper, arithmetic pa­
per, spelling paper, language paper, unruled paper, pencils, pens, an 
penholders The Bulletin listed these calculations by school so principals 
could compare their cost-effectiveness in issuing supplies to that of other 
schools. It also included curriculum outlines, suggested reading lists, and 
recommended smdy lists for teachers preparing for exarns, aiming to 
achieve uniformity throughout the system. Pleased with the success of 
Cooley’s efforts to achieve efficiency and economy, the board put aside its
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financial worries momentarily to vote him a five-year contract and a 
$10,000 per annum salary.^
Yet for all his success in securing administrative centralization, 
Cooley remained discontented: He also wanted legislative endorsement of 
what he had accomplished covertly through bureaucratic fiat. In 1901 the 
Civic Federation, with the support of Cooley and board member Clayton 
Mark, a Chicago businessman and later head of the Commercial Club’s 
educational committee, sponsored legislation in the Illinois legislature 
proposing further reforms along the lines advocated by the Harper Re­
port. But opposition lead by the CTF defeated the bill. Undeterred, the 
Civic Federation in 1903 supported another bill to increase the power of 
the superintendent to enable him to control appointment, promotion, and 
firing of teachers, to determine the course of study, and to reduce the size 
of the board from twenty-one to nine members. At the same time, Cooley 
and Mark supported a bill similar to the Civic Federation’s, except that 
the Cooley-Mark Bill did not stipulate any particular size for the school 
board. Both bills were designed to give legal sanction to what Cooley had 
already accomplished.^'
The state legislature refused to pass either bill, again due to the ener­
getic opposition of the CTF and the Chicago Federation of Labor. The 
Civic Federation’s bill, Margaret Haley claimed, “is fundamentally wrong 
because it creates an administrative officer and confers on him all the 
duties and powers namrally and necessarily inherent in the whole teaching 
force, and the people, through their representatives, thereby setting aside 
the principles of democracy in the internal administration of schools, pre­
cisely as the same principles are set aside in the government of the schools, 
so far as the whole people of Chicago are concerned. . . To Haley, the 
bill expressed a nationwide antidemocratic sentiment:
The situation in Chicago as far as the relation of the teacher to the system is 
concerned, is not peculiar to Chicago, but is general throughout the country. The 
tendency in the field of education today is the same as the tendency in the com­
mercial, the financial and the political world—that of concentration of power in 
one man or one set of men. This centralization of power has the effect of bringing 
the top captains of the world with untold power for good or ill to those under 
them and to those dependent on them.*’
But the bill threatened more than democratic principles and the profes­
sional autonomy of teachers. It also attacked their material security:
The whole bill is a denial of the rights of the rank and file, whether they be teacher 
or people. Teachers who have not only spent years in professional training, but 
have devoted their lives to the actual work of teaching, who are in fact the real
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educators of the children, have no security of tenure ot office or salary except that 
which the will of one man assures, and no more voice m the educational system ot 
which they are a part than the children they teach.”*
Contesting the Civic Federation’s bills in Springfield represented only 
part of the CTF’s efforts to protect democracy and the material interests 
of teachers. In 1900 and 1902 the union committed teachers to two 
unusual and controversial steps that challenged the board even further. In 
1900 the CTF filed a tax suit against corporate tax evaders, and two years 
later it affiliated with the Chicago Federation of Labor.
In the wake of a threatened salary cut in late 1899, Margaret Haley 
instigated an investigation of the Cook County tax system. She found that 
several hundred corporations had avoided paying city taxes. She per­
suaded the CTF to file suit against the tax delinquent firms in the hope of 
increasing the revenues of the board of education and the salaries of its 
teachers. Five public utility corporations alone owed taxes of $2,358,295- 
The courts decided in favor of the CTF in May 1901; in October the 
Illinois Supreme Court upheld the decision. Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. 
District Court; the court upheld the decision but reduced the sum to 
$600,000. In 1903-04, the delinquent corporations paid the sum to Cook 
County, which, in turn, passed the money on to the Chicago Board of 
Education. But in a quite remarkable display of arrogance and callousness, 
the board, rather than paying the increases in teachers’ salaries it had 
promised years before, decided to pay the coal bill, reinstitute kindergar­
tens, give the janitors a raise, and contribute money to the building fund. 
The board then added insult to injury by introducing the Cooley merit 
pay” scheme. Their material needs denied and their professional compe­
tence impuned, the members of the CTF voted to affiliate with the Chi­
cago Federation of Labor.*’
Haley justified affiliation as necessary to protect the material welfare 
of the teachers as wage earners and the need to join forces with those 
organizations struggling for a better education and democracy in America. 
“Two ideals are struggling for supremacy in American life today, she 
argued “one the industrial ideal, dominating through the supremacy of 
commercialism, which subordinates the worker to the product and the 
machine; the other, the ideal of democracy, the ideal of educators, which 
places humanity above all machines, and demands that all activity shall be 
the expression of life.” Because of the growing dominance of the industrial 
ideal and “the increased tendency toward Tactoryizing education,’ making 
the teacher an automaton, a mere factory hand, whose duty is to carry out 
mechanically and unquestionably the ideas and orders of those clothed
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with the authority of position, and who may or may not know the needs 
of the children or how to minister to them,” teachers needed to affiliate 
with organized labor. Affiliation offered a means through which teachers 
could “rid themselves of the reactionary conditions in and out of the 
classroom which are crushing out their lives and that of the children.” 
Through organization and cooperation the teachers could “save the 
schools for democracy and save democracy in the schools.”’°
Affiliation with the CFL proved to be a bitter pill for a number of 
teachers, who resigned from the CTF in protest. But the dissatisfaction 
did not hinder the growing involvement of the leadership of the CTF in a 
number of reform movements, particularly municipal ownership and 
women’s suffrage, both of which Ffaley and Goggin identified with the 
expansion of democracy in America." The same year (1902) the CTF 
affiliated with the Chicago Federation of Labor, it joined the Illinois 
Federation of Womens Clubs. Affiliation with the two organizations pro­
vided the necessary ingredients for a strategy of coordinated reform en­
compassing labor, teachers, and women, representing the factory, the 
school, and the home for the pursuit of social reform. While labor would 
“improve the standard of living of the poorest and weakest members of 
society” and democratize industry, and women would protect the integrity 
of the home and the nation through the ballot, teachers would fight to 
protect the material interests of teachers and to extend “democracy in the 
schools.”” Haley’s hopes for the alliance appeared well founded, at least 
in the short run. During the 1905-07 debates over a new charter for 
Chicago, the CTF, the CFL, and the women’s organizations combined to 
help defeat the educational provisions of the charter prepared by the Mer­
chants Club and Theodore Robinson of the Commercial Club that pro­
posed the selective appointment of school boards and administrative 
centralization. The CFL, for example, attacked the educational articles of 
the charter as an effort to transform public schools into “a cog in the 
capitalistic machine, so that . . . children reach manhood’s estate content 
in a condition of abject servitude.” There could be no other reason for 
centralized and autocratic authority, declared the CFL, than to impart a 
“reactionary mold to the minds” of fumre workers. Control of the school 
board and administrative centralization went hand in hand with control­
ling the content, pedagogy, and function of public education.”
Meanwhile, in early 1904 the CTF brought a suit against the board 
for the board’s failure to increase teacher salaries with funds derived from 
the successful tax evasion suit; in August 1904 Judge Edward F. Dunne 
decided against the board and for the teachers. The following year, the 
CTF energetically supported Dunne’s successful bid to become mayor of
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Chicago. Dunne responded by appointing seven new board members 
friendly to the CTF and, according to Jane Addams, “for the most part 
adherents to the new education”: Jane Addams herself; Cornelia DeBey, 
a physician and child labor reformer; John Harding, business agent for 
the Chicago Typographical Union; Mrs. Emmons Blaine, the widowed 
daughter of Cyrus McCormick; Emil Ritter, a manual training teacher 
and president of the Referendum League; and two others to represent the 
Polish and Jewish ethnic groups in the city.*^
In one of the board’s first acts, it appointed Ella Flagg Young, an 
ardent advocate of democratic decentralized administration and teacher 
councils, to the principalship of the Chicago Normal School. Addams 
secured appointment to the chairmanship of the powerful school manage­
ment committee, a role she believed would enable her to mediate between 
Cooley’s “commercialistic” administration and Haley’s CTF, since the 
“whole situation between the superintendent supported by the majority 
of the board, and the Teachers’ Federation had become an epitome of the 
struggle between efficiency and democracc^; on the one side a well-inten­
tioned expression of the bureaucracy necessary in a large svstem but which 
under pressure had become unnecessarily self-assertive, and on the other 
side a fairly militant demand for self-government made in the name of 
freedom.”"
It was not long, however, before Addams and Haley came to a painful 
parting of the ways. In May 1906 a dispute arose as to whether the 
teachers who had borne the cost of the tax fight should be the only ones 
to receive a salary increase. The CTF and Addams divided; Addams sug­
gested that the CTF was “self-seeking.” But what ultimately forced the 
issue was Addams’s failure to allow the CTF to petition the board against 
implementation of the Cooley promotional system. Addams thought that 
Cooley’s proposals would be of “undoubted benefit” and proceeded to 
find a compromise with Cooley: Cooley could keep his promotional 
scheme if he would allow teachers to substitute course work for the pro­
motional examination. Cooley accepted. Haley was appalled and described 
the affair as “one of her keenest disappointments” and a sign that Addams 
had “compromised her principles.” Haley decided to give up on Ad­
dams—who had become known as a “strong” supporter of Cooley—and 
to wait for seven more Dunne appointments before mounting a campaign 
to dismantle the Cooley administrative structure.’'’
Dunne made seven new appointments in July 1906. Uniformly sym­
pathetic to the vision of democratic administration sponsored by the CTF, 
the new members, particularly Ritter, Post, and DeBey, systematically
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attacked the administrative philosophy of the centralizers. Ritter com­
plained that former boards of education had been dominated by business­
men who had run “the schools on the factory plan.”’’ Post criticized the 
“spoilsmen” and the “business” board, denounced the “commercialistic 
ideal of the system,” the replacement by the “ethics of the counting room” 
of “democratic tendencies and educational ideals,” “high salaries for ad­
ministrators with low salaries for teaching,” and the “conception of au­
thoritative sequence” based on a docile board of directors, a dictatorial 
superintendent, department managers, bureau chiefs, and a body of teach­
ers responsive as a vast mechanism, like factory workers, to orders trans­
mitted from above. Post ticked off the despotic character of the 
administrative system under Cooley’s aegis—“the absurdly aristocratic 
marking methods, . . . the arbitrary salary-promotional device, . . . the 
silencing of the teaching body”—and decried “the irresponsible control 
which the Superintendent has over examinations for entrance, salary pro­
motion and functional promotion,” the “atmosphere of secrecy in which 
the system is immersed,” and “the demand that the Superintendent be 
allowed complete control, either without supervision or under a Board 
with little other power than to register his decrees.” Finally, Post found 
fault with Addams’s compromise promotions and salary scheme of the 
previous year: “The recent modifications of the promotional test appear 
to have been introduced by way of compromise at a time when the Chi­
cago Teachers’ Federation was urging the abolition of promotional ex­
aminations,” he argued. “While not open to some of the objections urged 
against the examinations, this test is equally objectionable as to its pur­
pose, which is to create arbitrary conditions for salary advancement.” 
Instead, he recommended a new policy including strict probationary re­
quirements for new teachers, a board of three examiners to conduct en­
trance examinations, that all teachers graded by their principals as 
“efficient” per se advance through the salary schedule on an annual basis, 
semiannual reports of principals on each teacher, and that teachers have 
time off to attend classes at the Normal School.’*
Cornelia DeBey added her voice to the chorus of criticism. Calling 
attention to the writings of John Dewey, Ella Flagg Young, and Albert 
Hart, DeBey decried the “despotic manipulation” of teachers by the 
“masterhands” and the hierarchical “methods of management. . . from the 
top downward.” She proposed instead a new system of management that 
worked “from the bottom upward”: the teaching force should have “ad­
visory authority and responsibility on educational subjects and the relation 
of the teaching body to the school system,” while the superintendent
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should have “administrative authority and advisory direction.” DeBey also 
recommended that teachers be organized at the local, district, and central
levels.” . .
The broadsides against the philosophy of centralized administration
provided the intellectual justification to dismantle the system of central­
ized administration desired by the reformers. The board repealed the 
Dawes antipull rule, altered the promotions scheme, dropped the previous 
board’s appeal to the state supreme court in the tax case, raised teacher 
salaries, debated the Post and DeBey reports, increased the membership 
of the board of superintendents from six to ten, appointed women to the 
four new district superintendent positions, voted to make decisions in 
teacher transfers, changed textbooks to include teacher choices in spellers 
and union-printed textbooks, and, finally, reorganized administration into 
a decentralized structure that included district councils with teacher rep- 
resentatives."^° For the moment, at least, “democracy” had triumphed over 
“efficiency.”
Partisans of business control and centralized authority did not, how­
ever, take all this lying down. Throughout the life of the Dunne board, 
the Daily News and the Chicago Tribune kept up an unremitting barrage of 
invective that was at times as inventive as it was vicious: “Freaks, cranks, 
monomaniacs and boodlers,” the Tribune called the reformers. Jane Ad- 
dams commented that “the newspapers had so constantly reflected and 
intensified the ideals of a business Board” that “from the beginning, any 
attempt the new Board made to discuss educational matters only excited 
their derision and contempt.”-^' At the same time, Chicago’s leading busi­
nessmen continued their campaign to extend administrative centralization. 
Declaring that the schools should be run on a “rational and business-like 
basis,” the Merchants Club, through the good offices of Cooley, brought 
Nicholas Murray Butler back to Chicago to define once again the goals of 
the efficiency movement and to rally the faithful. Butler ridiculed the idea 
of teacher councils for he would “as soon as think of talking about the 
democratization of the treatment of appendicitis” as to allow “the democ­
ratization of schools.” For Butler, “democracy is a principle of govern­
ment; and a democracy is as much entitled as a monarchy to have its 
business well done.” He concluded—to great applause—that if he were a 
board member he would do his “best to have adopted a by-law which 
would remove from the school service any teacher who affiliates . . . with 
a labor organization.”'*"
In the 1907 mayoral race, the Republican candidate, Fred Busse, 
defeated Dunne and installed a “business” board as he had promised.*’ 
The new board, dominated, wrote Jane Addams, by men “representing
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the leading Commercial Club of the city,” immediately went about dis­
mantling the work of the previous board and reactivating the centraliza­
tion program. In a symbolic gesture of class consciousness, the board 
renamed the Henry George School the George Pullman School."^ The 
board also supported legislation, drawn up by members Theodore Rob­
inson (vice-president of Illinois Steel, chairman of the education commit­
tee of the Commercial Club, and a leading advocate of charter revision 
and vocational education), to vest executive authority in the hands of a 
tenured superintendent and to reduce the size of the school board to 
fifteen members. The bill, however, went down to defeat, again largely 
due to the intense lobbying of the CTF and the CFL. Frustrated, Cooley 
resigned his position in March 1909, exclaiming as he did that no school 
reorganization program would be successful so long as the CTF existed."^* 
Although a final showdown between the business-dominated board 
and the CTF appeared imminent, in a surprise move the board appointed 
Ella Flagg Young superintendent to succeed Cooley. Young’s administra­
tive philosophy, articulated as a student of John Dewey’s at the University 
of Chicago and published in 1901, was almost an antipode of Cooley’s. 
Where Cooley desired to centralize power in the superintendent’s office. 
Young preferred a system of decentralized administration that gave teach­
ers a significant role through a system of teacher councils. Mrs. Young 
acknowledged the increasing size and complexity of urban school systems 
but did not view centralization and bureaucratization as their inevitable 
concommitants. Indeed, Mrs. Young argued, centralization and bureau­
cratization were undemocratic and un-American: “No more un-American 
or dangerous solution of the difficulties in maintaining a high degree of 
efficiency in the teaching corps of a large school system can be attempted 
than that which is effected by what is termed ‘close supervision.’ ” Power 
should be decentralized and decisions implemented through a federal sys­
tem of teachers’ councils ascending from the individuals’ schools to dis­
tricts to a central council. The councils would consider policy proposals 
and make recommendations; the superintendent would act according to 
her judgment but she would “be held responsible for the outcome.”^'’ 
Discerning the motives of the board’s members who appointed Mrs. 
Young can only be guesswork. Perhaps they wished to lower the level of 
political conflict between the CTF and the superintendent’s office; perhaps 
they imagined that the appointment of Mrs. Young would facilitate the 
implementation of a differentiated vocational curriculum. Mrs. Young, 
after all, strongly supported vocational education, and Theodore Robin­
son, a leading member of the board, was a major figure in the vocational 
education movement. In any event, the appointment of Mrs. Young cer-
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tainly reduced the level of conflict between the CTF and the office as Mrs. 
Young adopted policies near and dear to the hearts of the CTF member­
ship. She reduced classroom size, eliminated the secret marking system, 
modified the Cooley promotional plan, supported increased salaries, intro­
duced teachers’ councils, and consulted teachers on the selection of text­
books and curriculum development. As might be expected, the CTF 
thought very highly of Mrs. Young.-’" The relationship between Mrs. 
Young and the board proved far less cordial, however, particularly after 
Mrs. Young publicly opposed the Cooley Bill in the state legislation in 
1913.^* When she also refhsed to go along with the requests of two board 
members, William Rothmann and Jacob Loeb, to demote teachers who 
were leaders of the CTF or who opposed the efforts of Rothmann to gain 
control of the teachers’ pension hind, relations between Young and the 
board deteriorated even further.-’’' In an intriguing move, wholly inconsis­
tent with the philosophy of administrative centralization but accurately 
reflecting the concerns of the board with curriculum matters, the board 
voted to remove control over the course of study from the superinten­
dent’s office.'" Twice in 1913 Mrs. Young resigned her position (the 
second time the board split evenly on her reappointment), only to be 
reinstated by the board following widespread protests and pressure from 
Mayor Harrison."
Meanwhile, tensions between the CTF and the board also accelerated 
steadily. In 1912 and 1913 Harrison appointed several members—Roth­
mann, a lawyer, and Loeb, a real estate and insurance agent—intent on 
destroying the federation and gaining control of the teachers’ pension 
fund. In 1913 the CTF secured the defeat in the state legislature of a 
board-sponsored bill designed to increase board control of its pension 
fund.” In 1913 and 1915 the CTF led the opposition against the board- 
supported Cooley Bill. Thwarted by the CTF, Loeb bided his time. He 
eventually succeeded following a fiscal crisis in early 1915, the creation by 
the board of a committee of “efficiency and economy” to devise ways to 
lower costs (the committee recommended in May that teacher salaries be 
cut 7'/^%), the election of William Hale Thompson to the mayor’s office 
in April 1915, the creation of a state commission (the Baldwin Commis­
sion) to investigate the board and the CTF (an investigation probably 
intended to be a CTF witch hunt), and the effort by a CTF sympathizer 
in the Chicago council to investigate the financial records of the board of 
education.” On August 23, 1915, Loeb introduced a motion into the 
board committee meeting that denied the teachers the right to belong to 
any organization affiliated with trade unions or having paid business
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agents. On September i the full board adopted the motion by eleven to 
nine.-*^
The Loeb Rule provides a classic example—indeed one of the first in 
American history—of the application of the open shop philosophy to 
public employees. As in the battles between labor and capital, the issue 
centered on control of the workplace, but with one important difference: 
The rhetoric of “professionalism” and “service” replaced the “harmony of 
interests” doctrine of industrial life. “Teaching is not a trade, it is a profes­
sion, and one of the noblest professions,” explained Loeb. “In principle 
and in practice, trade unionism is inconsistent with and unnecessary to a 
professional career. In the schools it makes for a divided allegiance, it 
breeds suspicion and discontent. It destroys harmony and creates strife. It 
interferes with discipline and halts efficiency.”” The CTF was “a curse to 
the school system,” its leaders “lady labor sluggers.”’* “We’ve got to stop 
this unionization of teachers once and for all. It has gone far enough. 
These unions are growing like fire. They are taking over the schools and 
turning labor on us. We will cut them off from labor. We’ll cut their 
professional throats if we have to.””
Nine days after the adoption of the Loeb Rule, the Chicago Federa­
tion of Labor called a mass protest meeting at the Auditorium Theater. 
Samuel Gompers and Louis Post, now assistant secretary of labor, came 
from Washington to speak. For Post, the Loeb Rule represented yet an­
other effort by business to turn schools into factories by reducing teachers 
into factorylike workers. Alderman John Kennedy declared that business­
men and their representative, Jacob Loeb, wished to transform the school 
system “from a system of education for the development of the child, to a 
system to prepare the raw material for their factories and their shops and 
their mines and their stores. . . .” John Walker of the Illinois State Feder­
ation of Labor (ISFL) compared “the difference between school teachers 
who are free and untrammeled and independent, who have the right to 
act towards the school system as their biowledge of it and judgement 
leads them to believe is right, and, on the other hand, school teachers who 
will be held in the hollow of the hands of the direct representatives of the 
business interests.”'* The ILSF and CFL sent letters of protest to the 
governor of Illinois, denouncing the Loeb Rule as an effort by “big busi­
ness” to have the schools “create for them a body of trained, efficient, and 
somewhat servile workers” while providing “the cheapest possible sort of 
education.””' Margaret Haley linked the “determination of ‘Big Business’ 
to reduce the teachers to a state of servility” to the ongoing struggle 
between democracy and monopoly:
210 CLASS AND REFORM
The attack upon the teachers of Chicago . . . reveals the dearest ambition of the 
financial feudal lords of America who have agreed upon one economic and poi'tic 
principle that looks to the control of the Public School system in the country^ T 
motive is simple. Profits are being reduced by a growing 
Democraev demands that this control shall become more powerful 
The selfish interest of the wealth classes depends upon the breaking down of the 
popular power, therefore, your fight for life is as profound and as precious as the 
early struggles of the men who founded this nation.“
On September 23 the CTF obtained an injunction against the en­
forcement of the Loeb Rule on the grounds that it was too sweeping^ In 
response, the board on September 29 amended the rule to read “member­
ship in some teachers organizations which have officers, business agents or 
other representatives of the teaching force.- The courts held, however, 
that no action could be taken until June 1916 when the teachers would be 
up for reelection. In June Loeb, now president of the board, dismissed 
siW-eight teachers for failure to comply with the Loeb Rule (wenty- 
eight were federation members, including all eight of its officers). A storm 
of protest broke upon the board."" On July 17, i9i6, a public meeting, 
chaired by Mary McDowell, addressed by Janes Addams, Charles Mer- 
riam and Helen Hefferan of the Women’s City Club and president of the 
Illinois Congress of Parents and Teachers and provided with a statement 
prepared in part by Victor Olander and John Fitzpatrick, condemned the 
firings and called for the creation of a new citizens association."' Shortly 
afterward, representatives from twenty-eight civic organizations, along 
with Jane Addams, Grace Abbott, George Herbert Mead parks Mer- 
riam, John Fitzpatrick, and Victor Olander, founded the Public Education 
Association (PEA)."^ Not to be outdone, the Illinois Manufacturers As­
sociation (IMA) wrote the school board and Mayor Thompson support­
ing the Loeb Rule and created a rival organization, the Public School 
League (PSL). Two of the league’s directors were former presidents of 
the IMA; its president was president of the Rock Island Mining pmpany. 
Declaring that its goal was to “increase educational efficiency, the 1 SL 
sought the “entire elimination of the Teachers’ Eederation and its politico- 
labor activities.”"' Later that year, Loeb joined the PSL. „ , r
In the early months of 1917, the PEA, the PSL, and Robert Buck o 
the Chicago City Council each sponsored a bill in the Illinois legislature 
to settle the disputes over administrative structure and control once and 
for all."" The PEA-sponsored bill (the Otis Bill) provided for an eleven- 
member, unpaid, appointed board, three principal administrators (the 
superintendent, a business manager, and an attorney), and teacher tenure 
after three years’ service. Angus Shannon, the attorney responsible tor
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drawing up the major provisions of the bill, explained to a City Club 
audience that the “primary idea” behind the bill “was to place the admin­
istrative phase of school affairs in the hands of experts, removed from 
political influence, and subject only to the approval or disapproval of a 
board of education, in matters of policy. Thus, all details of the actual 
work would be in the hands of specialists.”'’" The PEA declared that 
among other objectives, the Otis Bill would allow “the board of education 
to organize the schools so that they shall employ the most expert people” 
while allowing for sufficient “progressiveness” in policy without jeopardiz­
ing “efficiency.”'’* Although the bill included no provisions for teacher 
councils, increased the powers of the central administration, and provided 
for an appointed rather than an elected board, the CTF did not oppose 
the bill since it did include a tenure clause for teachers.'’'' On April 20 a 
version of the Otis Bill passed the state legislature. After nearly twenty 
years of intense battle, the major goals of the original Harper Bill had 
been enacted into law. Centralization by statute had at last come to 
Chicago.
The very same day that the Otis Law passed, the Illinois Supreme 
Court, in a decision that Ella Flagg Young called the “Dred Scott Decision 
of Education,” decided that “the board has the absolute right to decline 
to employ or re-employ any applicant for any reasons or for no reason at 
all. . . .” Elated, Loeb exclaimed that it was “the happiest day in my 
life,. . . there will be no more labor unions in the public schools.” De­
feated, the CTF disaffiliated with the CEL, the ISFL, the AFT (founded 
the year before in Chicago with the CTF as Local No. i) and the Women’s 
Trade Union League. The CTF never fully recovered from the blow."°
The sequel to the passage of the Otis Law reveals little more than a 
series of comic opera sideshows, including doublecrosses between old 
allies, court battles between competing boards of education, hastily ar­
ranged marriages of convenience, the wholesale looting of educational 
funds on a scale unparalleled even for Chicago, three indifferent and color­
less superintendents, a lawsuit by one superintendent against a board of 
education, a grand jury investigation, the jailing of several board members 
for corruption, and the defeat of Mayor Thompson in 1923."' Under the 
circumstances, very little further centralization took place despite the de­
moralization of the CTF. When in 1924 a new board appointed a new 
superintendent, a disciple of Nicholas Murray Butler, the efficiency­
conscious, single-minded, strong-willed William McAndrew, the process 
of centralization resumed with a vengeance.
Very little irritated William McAndrew more than “inefficiency,” “lax 
standards,” and the usurpation of the superintendent’s autonomy, whether
t/
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by teachers or the board of education. As much as anything else, Mc- 
Andrew believed in social efficiency, the prerogatives of the superinten­
dent, and “close supervision.” He roundly condemned the board of 
education’s meddling in the superintendent’s affairs. Referring to the 
“tragi-comedy” prior to his appointment, McAndrew traced its source to 
“the outworn fallacy that a superintendent is the board’s . . . executive to 
carry out their policies. He isn’t. . . . They can’t say what medicines shall 
be used or what operations shall be performed. Somebody had to tell ’em 
that.”’^ Similarly, McAndrew had no use for the CTF or teacher councils. 
In 1927 he informed an audience that he had been brought to Chicago 
for the purpose of “loosening the hold of this ‘invisible empire’ within the 
schools, a weird system, a selfish system, doing everything to indicate a 
selfish purpose and demanding the right to govern the schools.”’’ And 
although required by board regulations to call meetings of the teachers’ 
councils on a regular basis, he either refused to do so or allowed them to 
meet only under conditions specified by himself: meetings were not to be 
held during school hours, and principals could not be excluded as has 
been the custom, since to do so was “repugnant to experience, discipline 
and efficiency.” The system of teachers’ councils, he argued, violated the 
principles of “the standard works on school management in which there 
is a direct line of control from Board through superintendent and principal 
down to teacher. . . .” Teachers required not autonomy but “close super­
vision.’”*
McAndrew’s regime of “close supervision” introduced a series of re­
forms. He required every teacher to check a report sheet four times a day, 
established fixed criteria of performance that made no allowance for the 
size of classes or children’s backgrounds, and introduced standardized tests 
and a system of “line and staflP’ supervision to ensure strict compliance. 
McAndrew’s “Official Notice on Teacher Efficiency” for 1925-26 con­
tained little that was different from Cooley’s original scheme. Knowledge 
of subject accounted for 10 percent; teaching ability 20 percent; progress 
of pupils JO percent; cooperation with pupils and community 10 percent; 
cooperation in school management 15 percent; professional standing and 
growth (including adaptability to suggestion for professional improve­
ment) 15 percent. Finally, an open-ended category for “demerits” allowed 
a principal for any reason at all to take off as many points as he wished. 
McAndrew informed principals that they had “the iron hand” and should 
use it.”
Although McAndrew flatly opposed eftbrts by politicians, business­
men, or teachers to dictate educational policy to the superintendent’s 
office, he was by no means hostile to businessmen or to their interests.
Centralization and Transformation of Public Education 213
McAndrew insisted on a “100 percent mastery program” in the basics— 
reading, writing, and arithmetic—favored by businessmen and solicited 
their opinion on the “efficiency” of the schools by sending out letters to 
members of the Association of Commerce under the heading “Customers’ 
Estimate of Service.” McAndrew did not send similar letters to leaders of 
the labor movement or to the parents sending their children to school.’® 
In May 1926 McAndrew organized the first of a series of “Citizens’ Sam­
pling Days” to demonstrate to the school system’s “stockholders”—rep­
resentatives from leading civic organizations—the quality of the schools’ 
“human output” and the degree to which the “human output” satisfied 
the “requirements” of the stockholders. On the appointed day, represen­
tatives from business firms, the Chicago Association of Commerce, the 
Union League Club, the City Club, the Women’s City Club, the Chicago 
Bar Association, the settlement movement, and other organizations plied 
the children with questions and tests of skill.” For one invited citizen 
stockholder who did not attend, John Fitzpatrick of the CFL, there could 
be no doubting the meaning of “Citizens Sampling Day.”
I cannot understand what you and your assistants are thinking about when you 
talk about ‘output customers. Stockholders and Sampling Day’ unless you imagine 
that you are running some kind of a mill or factory while you are grinding out a 
certain kind of product or material and you are going to get the ‘stockholders and 
customers’ together and bring forth ‘samples’ as an exhibit of your ‘output.’
. . . Thus ‘sampling day,’ as you present it, is nothing more or less than an 
exhibition of the effort and result of eight years’ schooling to make the youngsters 
think and act alike. . . . And the customers will be shown that the products of our 
public schools jump when the string is pulled, and they will be splendid material 
to draw upon for employees in stores, offices, shops, factories, or elsewhere.
The parents are not consulted as to whether or not they are satisfied with the 
kind of schooling their children are getting. But why should they be consulted? 
The schools are not being run for them but for the ‘stockholders and customers.’’*
The following year, 1927, the voters of Chicago reelected William 
Flail Thompson as mayor of Chicago. During his campaign, Thompson, 
perhaps wishing to establish his presence in international affairs before 
running for the office of president of the United States, attacked 
McAndrew for allowing “pro-British” books into the schools and prom­
ised to “punch King George in the snoot.” After his election, Thompson 
promptly engineered a “trial” of McAndrew by the board and 
McAndrew’s dismissal.”' In a symbolic parting of the ways, the CTF and 
the CFL supported Thompson, while the Joint Committee on Public 
School Affairs, an umbrella organization of twenty-nine civic organiza­
tions and aging Progressive reformers, supported McAndrew.*'’ Yet, al-
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though Thompson dismissed McAndrew, the dismissal did nothing to 
undo the centralization of educational administration or to roll back the 
business-oriented ideology of social efficiency that dominated the admin­
istration and curriculum of Chicago’s public schools. McAndrew’s demise 
did not presage an assault on centralization or on the ideology of social 
efficiency. McAndrew went, but centralization stayed; Thompson won, 
but social efficiency prevailed.
Centralization, Business, and Progressive Politics
Between 1899 and the mid-i920s, a coalition of school superintendents 
and businessmen, with the occasional support of other Progressives, man­
aged to secure, through a combination of administrative fiat and legislative 
statute, the major recommendation of the Harper Report of 1899: “radi­
cal” reform of the “largely defective” administrative structure of public 
education in Chicago. The victory of this coalition raises three general 
questions: first, the character and significance of their victory; second, the 
nature of the coalition that achieved it—the relationship between the 
administrative progressives, the business community, and Progressive re­
form generally; and third, the character of the opposition that centraliza­
tion generated.
The phenomenology of success is readily apparent. The coalition 
succeeded in securing the reduction in the size of the school board, the 
appointment rather than the election of school board members, and the 
nonremuneration of members. Board members had been appointed rather 
than elected prior to the Progressive Era, and they had not been remuner­
ated for their services either, but in light of the demands ot the CTF and 
the CFL for the election and payment of school board members, the 
continued appointment and nonpayment of school board members should 
count as victories for the reform coalition. The net effect of the reforms is 
also not difficult to discern. Although businessmen were highly overrepre­
sented on the board prior to 1899, after 1900 they dominated it, with the 
sole exception of the Dunne board between 1905 and 1907. George 
Counts, in his study of school politics in Chicago, reveals that all 120 
members of the board he studied between 1903 ^nd 1926 were drawn 
entirely from the middle and favored classes. . . . The Chicago Board of 
Education has been composed almost exclusively of persons engaged in 
proprietorial, managerial, professional, and commercial occupations 
lawyers, physicians, corporation presidents, manufacturers, merchants.
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publishers, real estate agents, bankers, architects, contractors, insurance 
agents, and dentists.” Moreover, after the formation of the Association of 
Commerce in 1904, the association had, on average, three or four mem­
bers serving on the board at any one time; during the first three years of 
McAndrews’s administration, five of the eleven members were members 
of the Association of Commerce.*'
In addition, the coalition drastically altered the administrative struc­
ture of public education in the decades after 1899: It secured the clear 
differentiation of legislative and administrative functions, and it imposed 
a hierarchically organized structure of authority, modeled on corporate 
industry, that located centralized power over the teaching force, the edu­
cational process, and the day-to-day operation of the school system in the 
superintendent’s office. Cooley’s “anti-pull” rule and his “promotional 
scheme” secured centralized control over the hiring, promotions, and sal­
aries of teachers; other reforms secured centralized control over their train­
ing as well, while Loeb’s Rule severely hampered the ability of the CTF 
to wield political power over the board or resist the superintendent’s will. 
Although McAndrews failed to wrest control of the day-to-day operation 
of the school system from the local school management committees, 
Cooley succeeded. Securing control over the educational process proved a 
more complicated task. The organizational strucmre of the educational 
process—the fact that teachers taught in self-contained classrooms free 
from direct supervision of principals, and with some immunity from the 
imposition of more technical forms of control characteristic of industrial 
work processes—limited the ability of the superintendent’s office to gain 
control over the educational process.*" Nevertheless, the administrative 
progressives succeeded in securing as much control over the educational 
process as its organizational structure would permit. Each superintendent, 
but above all McAndrew with his regime of “close supervision” and con­
stant measurement, increased the control of the superintendent’s office 
over grading standards, student promotional policies, textbook selection, 
and pedagogical methods—the bureaucratization of pedagogical practices 
described in chapter 2. Finally, the superintendent’s office exercised mo­
nopoly powers over the course of study, although for a brief period during 
Ella Flagg Young’s incumbency the board removed authority over the 
course of study from her office. In effect, centralized control over the day- 
to-day operation of the school system, over teachers, and—within the 
limits imposed by the classroom system—over the educational process 
represented the successful imposition of a hierarchical structure of social 
relations and the creation of what Willard Waller described as a “punish-
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ment-centered bureaucracy” in which superintendents exercised “domina- 
tive” authority over teachers, an educational version of the shift from 
formal to real subordination characteristic of corporate industry.*’
Two groups could fairly claim responsibility for the success of the 
centralization movement; businessmen and their organizations, and an 
ambitious but clearsighted cadre of aspiring professional educational ad­
ministrators who, with one exception, occupied the superintendent s office 
between 1899 and 1927—Harper, Andrew, Cooley, and McAndrew. Of 
the two groups, the administrative progressives were far more committed 
in principle to centralization. Indeed, there are ample grounds for believ­
ing that many of the businessmen who supported centralization did so not 
because they supported educational centralization as a matter of principle 
but because they wished to engage in various forms of petty accumulation- 
ist activity or pursue an open shop campaign. Membership on the board, 
support for centralization, and opposition to the CTF were far from one 
and the same thing.
Chicago’s administrative progressives pursued centralization for a va­
riety of reasons, although not because they were forced to, as Raymond 
Callahan suggests. Callahan argues that educational administrators advo­
cated centralization for purely defensive reasons: by virtue of the “vulner­
ability” of their positions to business-dominated boards of education, 
administrators adopted the ideology of social efficiency and pursued cen­
tralization to protect their jobs.*"’ This does not seem to have been the 
case in Chicago. True, businessmen dominated the board of education 
and superintendents served at the pleasure of the board. But the business- 
dominated board of education did not impose the ideology of social effi­
ciency or the particular model of centralized and hierarchical administra­
tion on a recalcitrant Edwin Cooley or an unwilling William McAndrew. 
Both men viewed themselves as apostles of the new order. Both whole­
heartedly, even passionately, believed in social efficiency and centraliza­
tion, proselytized on its behalf, and attempted, against bitter opposition 
from the CTF and the CFL, to advance the cause of one and institution­
alize the other. The explanation of the adoption of social efficiency doc­
trines and centralization by the administrative progressives lies elsewhere 
than in the “vulnerability” of their positions.
In part, the centralized and hierarchical bureaucratic structure that 
the administrative progressives and their business allies imposed reflected 
a response to a genuine crisis of financial solvency and administrative 
coordination associated with the rapid expansion of the school system in 
the years after 1890. But problems of coordination and financial solvency 
can explain only part of the popularity of the corporate model of admin-
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istration. Administrative coordination can be achieved through a variety 
of administrative structures: the administrative progressives sought not 
just coordination but centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic control.*’ The 
administrative problems facing the administrative progressives were real 
enough, but the administrative structure they imposed expressed a partic­
ular political construction of administration—the assumption, shared with 
other followers of administrative progressivism writ large, that administra­
tive efficiency necessitated a centralized, hierarchical, and bureaucratic ad­
ministration characteristic of corporate industry. The fact that the board 
frequently turned a blind eye toward corporate tax evasions and low prop­
erty assessments, that it sold prime inner city land to resolve immediate 
fiscal problems, and that it leased valuable school land at a fraction of its 
real value to major corporations in Chicago only exacerbated the prob­
lem.*'’ Moreover, administrative progressives, like their ideological com­
patriots in civic reform, were intensely leary of machine politics and imag­
ined that a clear separation between legislative and administrative func­
tions, and the centralization of educational decision-making in the super­
intendent’s office, would limit the capacity of “politics” to corrupt the 
administrative process. Again, the fledgling science of educational admin­
istration developing at Stanford, Columbia, and Chicago lauded the cor­
porate model for its efficiency, economy, and parsimony.*- Finally, insofar 
as educational centralization promised to create a profession at once pow­
erful, respected, and remunerative, it provided a means of advancing the 
claims of meritocratic expertise as a legitimate form—and source—of so­
cial authority and secured the “collective mobility” of an aspiring profes­
sional group of educational administrators. In a word, centralization was 
part and parcel of a process of class formation—the making of the profes­
sional middle class.**
The administrative progressives did not succeed alone and unaided. 
Indeed, businessmen, business organizations, and a business-dominated 
political reform organization (the Civic Federation) aided and abetted 
them in important ways. The Civic Federation sponsored Harper’s en­
trance into public school politics when it nominated him for the board of 
education in 1894, supported the formation of the Harper Commission 
in 1898, sponsored the Harper Bill three times in the state legislature, in 
1899, in 1901, and again in 1903, and created the Commission of One 
Hundred to advance the cause of centralization; the business-dominated 
board gave unwavering support: to the efforts of Andrews, Cooley, and 
McAndrew to centralize educational administration; representatives from 
the Merchants’ Club and the Commercial Club drew up the education 
provisions of the revised city charter in 1905—07; Clayton Mark of the
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Commercial Club collaborated with Edwin Cooley in drawing up another 
bill submitted to the state legislamre in 190;; Theodore Robinson, also 
of the Commercial Club, assumed responsibility for drafting another ver 
Sion of the Harper Bill in 1909; Jacob Loeb broke the affiliation of ffie 
CTF with the CEL; the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association created the 
Public School League in 1916 to support Loeb’s efforts to dismember, as
'^Tut although businessmen dominated the board during the period 
when it imposed centralized administration, and although they assumed 
major responsibility for securing legislation sanctioning centralization, for 
the most part, businessmen supported centralization, or what is not quite 
the same ffiing, opposed the CTF, for very different *a" ^
motivating the efforts of the administrative progressives. In general, rela­
tively few businessmen were seriously interested in centralization per se, 
and Len fewer supported centralization because they were 
committed, as a matter of principle, to centralization. Indeed, while re 
form of the conditions of board membership helped consolidate business 
domination of the board of education, it is fairly clear that in part business 
domination of the board did not so much reflect business preoccupation 
with principles of social efficiency and centralized administration but a 
belief among many businessmen that board membership represented 
opportunity^o engage m one form or another of petty accumulation. 
Some like William Rothmann, for example, were little more than greedy 
avaricious opportunists interested in tapping the revenues of the board 
(or the teachers’ pension fund) to line their own pockets, or they wished 
io punish, hobble" and, if possible, destoy the CTF for its efforts to^e 
public utilities, a major newspaper (the Tnbune), and several dozen large 
Lrporations (including Pullman and Armour) for tax evasion, ‘ow prop­
el assessments, and the leasing of valuable school board property to 
bSinessmen for a fraction of its market value. For such businessmen, 
centralization, or opposition to the CTF, were matters of immediate eco­
nomic gain, not political principle. On occasion some businessmen sup­
ported centralization or opposed the CTF as a matter of principR: The 
businessmen associated with the Merchants’ Club who drew up jdu 
cational provisions of the proposed city charter ^05-07 were better 
government” businessmen interested in keeping school costs and, t 
fore taxes to a minimum as a matter of economic principle, while Jacob 
Loeb and the members of the PSL who battled the CTF 
anti-union, open shop ideologists committed to the destruction of the
CTF and the labor movement generally.
Yet, not all businessmen supported centralization or opposed th
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CTF simply because board membership provided an opportunity to en­
gage in petty accumulationist activity or indulge in open shop demagog­
uery or to keep taxes low. Some, at least, had a broader view. The very 
same Civic Federation that sponsored Harper and then the Harper Bills 
in 1899, 1901, and 1903, also supported municipal reform through the 
Municipal Voters League, whose approach to public administration and 
politics differed not a whit from the views of the administrative progres­
sives. Both looked askance on the corruption of democratic politics, both 
wished to separate as far as possible legislative and administrative func­
tions, both endeavored to ensure economy and efficiency in government 
and the election of responsible citizens to elective office, and both imposed 
a hierarchical and centralized model of governance on public administra­
tion. Moreover, individuals and organizations closely linked to the cen­
tralization movement were also closely linked to the movement to 
vocationalize and differentiate the curricula of public education in Chi­
cago. Both Clayton Mark and Theodore Robinson took responsibility for 
drafting versions of the Harper Bill and participated in the vocational 
education movement. Edwin Cooley advanced the cause of centralization 
and vocational education as superintendent between 1901 and 1909, and 
after 1910 played a key role in attempting to secure a system of differen­
tiated education. Both Mark and Robinson, it will be recalled, were chair­
men of the educational committee of the Commercial Club—the very 
same organization that sponsored Cooley’s campaign to differentiate the 
public school system. In effect, the same individuals, the same organiza­
tions, and the same philosophy—social efficiency—guided both central­
ization and vocational education to victory. Where one set of reforms 
ensured that businessmen formally governed the school system and that 
superintendents administered the school system in a businesslike manner 
according to businesslike principles, the second transformed schooling 
into a business institution, an adjunct to the market economy.
Two groups, businessmen and the administrative progressives, de­
serve the bulk of the credit for the success of the centralization movement. 
But, on occasion, mainline Progressive reformers also provided important 
support. This is particularly apparent in the support of the Harper Bill by 
the Civic Federation in 1899, 1901, and 1903, in Jane Addams’s qualified 
support for Coole}^s promotional scheme in 1906, the foundation of the 
PEA in 1916 by Addams, Merriam, McDowell, Mead, Abbott, and oth­
ers, passage of the Otis Bill in 1917, and the support of McAndrew by 
the Joint Committee on Public School Affairs in the mid-i92os (when 
McAndrew fought to introduce junior high schools, the platoon system, 
intelligence testing, and “close supervision,” and fought off political inter-
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ference in the administration of the school system). The fact that Addams, 
Merriam, Mead, Abbott, and others protested the Loeb Rule in 1916, or 
that Addams supported the affiliation of the CTF with the CFL, did not 
represent an ambivalent or limited commitment to centralization; it 
merely indicated that they did not identify the cause of centralization with 
opposition to the affiliation of the CTF with organized labor.
If support among Progressive reformers for centralization did not 
necessarily involve opposition to the CTF, there can be no doubting the 
opposition of the CTF itself to centralization. At the time of its founding 
in 1897, the concerns of the CTF membership were limited to two issues: 
salaries and pensions. At the time, the question of tenure was not a live 
issue—Governor Altgeld in 1895 had managed to insert a limited tenure 
provision for teachers in the pension law of 1895. Yet within the space of 
three and a half years, between January 1899 and mid-1902, a series of 
events rapidly expanded the preoccupations of the CTF: the release of the 
Harper Report in early 1899, the sponsorship of the first of the Harper 
Bills in the state legislature later that year and again in 1901 and 1903 by 
the Civic Federation, the appointment of two self-confessed centralizers, 
Andrews and Cooley, as superintendents, the refusal of the board to in­
crease teacher salaries in 1899 on the grounds of insufficient funds, 
Cooley’s “anti-pull” crusade and his introduction of a “new promotional 
scheme” and merit pay system in 1901—02, and the refusal of the board 
to increase teachers’ salaries in 1901 following the CTF’s court victory in 
the tax case. In response to these events, the agenda of the CTF expanded 
to include issues involving conditions of entry and promotion, job con­
trol, and social reform. That agenda changed little for more than thirteen 
years until 1916 when the board’s firing of sixty-eight teachers added 
tenure to the list. For almost two decades, the CTF actively pursued the 
cause of “democracy in the schools” and “democracy for the schools.” The 
former focused on resisting the imposition of “close supervision” and 
hierarchical, centralized, and bureaucratic control within the workplace 
while attempting to secure a system of teacher councils, decentralized 
control, and professional autonomy, as well as job security. The latter, 
“democracy for the schools,” centered on a variety of reform movements 
after 1900: tax reform, municipal ownership, antimonopoly, women’s 
suffrage, and support for organized labor.
Teacher councils represented the core of the CTF’s campaign for 
“democracy in the schools.” Ironically, the Harper Commission first raised 
the possibility of a system of teacher councils in 1899, but the commission 
intended the councils to be without any formal authority—a mere tea- 
and-biscuits device, not an administrative agency or policy-making body.
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But the influence and writings of Francis Parker, John Dewey, Ella Flagg 
Young, and Cornelia DeBey suggested a far more substantial and agree­
able system of teacher councils and decentralized administration. Many 
teachers, certainly the leadership of the CTF, were thoroughly familiar 
with Ella Flagg Young’s Isolation in the Schools, and many had been deeply 
influenced by Parker and Dewey, some as students, or through attending 
their public lectures and reading their published works. Margaret Haley, 
for instance, drew upon Parker and Dewey to explain and justify her 
conviction that teachers, by virtue of the great responsibility they assumed 
for the training and cultivation of the minds, personalities, and character 
of children, required sufficient professional autonomy to be able to re­
spond meaningfully to individual student differences and needs and a level 
of material security and professional prestige befitting the importance of 
their responsibilities:*®
To the teacher it means freedom from care and worry for the material needs of the 
present and future—in other words, adequate salary and old age pensions; free­
dom to teach the child as an individual and not to deal with children en masse. In 
other words, fewer children for each teacher. Last but not least, the teacher must 
have recognition in the educational system as an educator. The tendency is to 
relegate her to the position of a factory hand, or to the orders from above.
Indeed, teachers found the demand for teacher professionalism 
voiced by administrative progressives hypocritical and contradictory. They 
dismissed “professionalism as service” as a ploy to keep teachers’ salaries 
low. To insist on professionalism while denying teachers control over the 
conditions of entry and certification requirements common to other 
professions, failing to provide adequate tenure, job security, and salaries, 
and refusing to institute a system of councils was sheer hypocrisy. What 
else could the teachers conclude of the decision of the Board to refuse to 
give teachers time off to attend a public lecture by G. Stanley Hall on the 
grounds that the board believed the teachers were not ready for Hall’s 
ideas.
Teachers pursued job security, teachers’ councils, decentralized ad­
ministration, and professional autonomy under the banner of “democracy 
in the schools.” But the quest for democracy also involved a wider political 
commitment to the extension of democratic principles to all aspects of 
social life. Like John Dewey, the CTF leadership argued that democracy 
in the schools could not be separated from—indeed in the long run neces­
sitated—democracy in the wider society. Certainly, the fights against tax 
evasion by the utility corporations and the leasing arrangements between 
the board and several Chicago companies were motivated in part by the
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decision of the board to renege on promised salary increases. But these 
struggles also expressed an antimonopoly and equal rights philosophy 
with ideological roots in Populism, Greenbackism, and the Knights of 
Labor (all of which were part of the political culture of Margaret Haley s 
family), and the single tax philosophy of Henry George’s Poverty and 
Progress, a book that Margaret Haley had read and described as having 
“had a profound effect on me.”-” Again, the support of the CTF for the 
municipal ownership movement, like the fight against the “industrial 
ideal” and “one-man rule” in education, expressed an antimonopoly and 
equal rights sentiment against “money power,” class privilege, and the 
“concentration of power in one man or one set of men.”-'" The battle to 
elect Dunne mayor of Chicago, and the appointment of the Dunne school 
board, particularly Louis Post, a Georgite single taxer, reflected the CTF s 
efforts to secure a popularly based school board inspired not by the “in­
dustrial ideal” but by democratic principles. Affiliation with the Chicago 
Federation of Labor in 1902 represented more than a tactical move by the 
CTF to protect the material and professional interests of its membership. 
It also represented the commitment of the CTF to broader democratic 
political objectives. While the depth of support among the membership of 
the CTF for women’s suffrage is unknown, Haley herself worked tirelessly 
on its behalf for more than a decade, lecturing, traveling, lobbying, orga­
nizing, and answering mail.-”
Finally, in pursuit of “democracy for the schools,” the CTF played a 
leading role in founding the American Federation of Teachers in 1916, 
and in effecting, between 1903 and 1910, a number of significant reforms 
within the National Education Association.-”^ Through adroit political 
maneuvering, feminist fellowship and the garnishing of widespread grass­
roots support, the CTF fractured the power of the ruling oligarchy (led 
by William T. Harris and Nicholas Murray Butler) of the NEA, reformed 
selection procedures, elected Ella Elagg Young president in 1910, en­
larged the size of the National Council on Education, refocused some of 
the NEA’s energies and funds onto questions of teachers’ salaries, pen­
sions, and tenure, and secured the creation of the Department of Class­
room Teachers.-”
The involvement of the CTF leadership in this broad array ot reform 
movements on behalf of democracy for the schools and the protracted 
struggle of the CTF to secure professional autonomy and decentralized 
administration in the workplace preclude the conclusion, advocated by 
some historians, that the goals of the CTF were little more than expres­
sions of an economistic philosophy of pure and simple unionism.'”’ Cer-
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tainly the CTF leadership believed that the pursuit of these political objec­
tives would enhance the material and professional well-being of teachers, 
but their commitment also reflected a larger political commitment to the 
extension of democratic social relations in America. Indeed, the politics of 
the CTF closely resemble the politics of “reform unionism” characteristic 
of the Knights of Labor during the 1880s rather than the narrow econ- 
omistic policies of “pure and simple” unionism of the 1900s. Like the 
unions that flocked to the Knights of Labor, the CTF pursued a program 
that combined improved material welfare, job autonomy, and the preser­
vation—or restoration—of democratic social relations in America, and 
nourished its politics with the traditions of antimonopolism and equal 
rights radical republicanism. The CTF did not, admittedly, protest prole­
tarianization as the Knights had, but it did protest the threat that the new 
training and appointment procedures represented to working-class 
women seeking respectability and a measure of economic independence.
Other parallels, besides those of politics and ideology, can also be 
found. Some historians of the Knights of Labor (Commons, Perlman, and 
Grob, for example) argue that the Knights articulated a “transitional” 
“pre-industrial labor consciousness” prior to the triumph of pure and 
simple unionism. Similarly, it could be argued (indeed, it is implicit in 
Robert Reid’s history of the CTF) that the CTF represents, as it were, a 
transitional or pre-professional consciousness prior to the triumph of pure 
and simple professionalism (to coin a phrase) and the organizational rev­
olution.’- Neither interpretation, however, can withstand close scrutiny. 
To describe the consciousness of the Knights of Labor as a form of “pre­
industrial labor consciousness” ignores the critique of industrial capitalism 
articulated by the Knights and the vision of democratic industrial organi­
zation that the Knights proposed. Moreover, the labor historians who 
described the Knights as a transitional phenomenon assumed a particular 
telos: the inevitable (and laudable) triumph of pure and simple unionism. 
But the Knights were not defeated by teleology. Rather, Haymarket, the 
shift from formal to real subordination, and the process of working-class 
formation—the replacement of the first generation of industrial workers 
by the second (largely immigrant) generation and the development of the 
labor aristocracy—destroyed the Knights. Likewise, a pre-professional 
consciousness did not characterize the CTF; instead, it developed an in­
formed critique of centralization, while at the same time articulating an 
alternative model of administrative structure and professional autonomy. 
Moreover, the defeat of the CTF did not reflect the realization of an 
omniscient logic of professionalization or express an immutable bureau-
224 CLASS AND REFORM
cratic imperative toward administrative rationalization. Rather, it reflected 
the combined effect of particular and highly contingent political events 
and processes. Two of these were particularly significant.
First, the social authority of the ideology of social efficiency and the 
political power of the administrative progressives and their business allies 
enabled the apostles of centralization to push through a series of reforms 
that radically circumscribed the power of the teachers and limited the 
ability of the CTF leadership to sustain a militant unionist and radical 
political posmre. The board’s adoption of the Loeb Rule in 1916, for 
instance, destroyed a major power base of the CTF—affiliation with or­
ganized labor—and broke the spirit of the CTF membership, or at least 
the spirit of its leadership. The success, moreover, of the administrative 
progressives in gaining control of teacher training and appointment en­
abled the superintendent to socialize teachers to the new pedagogical and 
administrative order and to tie the careers of teachers to the superinten­
dent’s office rather than to local district committees. In effect, Cooley 
succeeded in breaking the nexus between working-class neighborhood 
politics, represented by the local school committee, and control of the 
work place—training, appointment, and promotion. Finally, the expan­
sion of the school system and the lengthening of job ladders (for women 
as well as men) created new job opportunities for ambitious middle-class 
college educated women and created a new faction, a labor aristocracy, 
within the teaching force—principals, vice-principals, specialists of various 
kinds—whose fortunes were closely tied to the new administrative order.
Second, the changing social composition of the teaching force under­
mined the capacity of the CTF leadership to foster the growth and matu­
ration of a radical working-class organization. During the closing years of 
the nineteenth century, the social composition of the teaching force 
changed quite dramatically; between 1880 and 1900, for instance, the 
percentage of daughters of semi- and unskilled workers in the labor force 
dropped from 17.7 percent to 7.9 percent, and the proportion for all blue- 
collar daughters declined from 47.7 percent to 35.6 percent, while the 
percentage of daughters from high white-collar homes increased from 
15.4 percent to 27.2 percent. A similar decline characterizes the ethnic 
pattern: among immigrant families, the percentage of daughters from 
households with one or more foreign-born or semiskilled or unskilled 
parents dropped significantly from a high of 22.7 percent in 1880 to 7 
percent in moo.”* A noticeable shift in the demographic profile of the 
teaching profession thus occurred between 1880 and 1900, the very year 
the first cohort of teachers required to have three years of postsecondary 
education entered the teaching force, although we do not know whether.
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or to what extent, the latter contributed to the former. There is every 
reason to suspect, moreover, that the demographic trend apparent by 
1900 continued after 1900. Edwin Cooley had only to pay low wages 
(relative to office and factory work) to push the daughters of low white- 
collar and blue-collar origins out of a profession in the process of redefi­
nition to accommodate middle-class daughters seeking temporary employ­
ment before marriage. Expanding opportunities in clercial work attracted 
women out of teaching, but the disincentives to stay in education encour­
aged the most assertive and militant to give up any ambitions they may 
have had in the schools and leave. What had initially been an occupation 
of working-class women was still, in 1902, the year the CTF affiliated 
with the CEL, dominated by women from a working-class background, 
but the writing was on the wall. By the time the board adopted the Loeb 
Rule in 1916, the membership of the CTE had probably become predom­
inantly middle class in character, and after 1916, middle class in outlook 
as pure and simple professionalism replaced reform unionism.
In opposing centralization, the CTF received support from several 
sources. It received support from mainline Progressive reformers in 1916 
during the crisis over the Loeb Rule, not because Progressives opposed 
centralization, but because Progressive reformers were dismayed by 
Loeb’s hard line, open shop tactics and confrontational politics. Indeed, 
in the aftermath of the Loeb crisis, the organization created by the Pro­
gressives, the PEA, worked energetically to secure passage of the Otis Bill, 
which gave legislative sanction to centralization. The CTF also received 
support from members of the Dunne board, particularly Ritter, Post, and 
DeBey. Jane Addams supported the CTF on some issues (e.g., affiliation 
with organized labor) but opposed it on others (e.g., with regard to 
Cooley’s promotions and merit pay scheme). Ella Flagg Young supported 
the right of the CTF to affiliate with the CEL, but more importantly, 
supported decentralized administration and teacher councils.
The CTF’s most important and persistent support, however, came 
from organized labor, particularly the CEL. The CEL strenuously sup­
ported the industrial policies of the CTF to improve conditions of em­
ployment and gain a measure of job control through decentralized 
administration and teacher councils, but the support of the CEL for the 
CTF went far beyond fraternal duty. The CEE’s support also expressed a 
deep sympathy to the political orientation and commitments of the CTF— 
its efforts to create a democratic education for a democratic society. Like 
the leadership of the CTF, the CEL feared that centralization represented 
an effort to prevent the democratic control and administration of educa­
tion in order to create a class-stratified system of education to serv'e the
■ I
226 CLASS AND REFORM
needs of business. Hence, the considerable resiliency and potency of the 
factory metaphor in the rhetoric of the CFL (and the CTF) ; their belief 
that businessmen and Superintendents Andrews, Cooley, and McAndrew 
wanted to create a factorylike education, governed autocratically by busi­
nessmen and the superintendent’s office, in which factorylike workers 
(teachers) would train in a factorylike manner in specialized production 
processes (differentiated curricula) future factory workers.
For a little over a decade and a half, the coalition between the CTF 
and the CFL, with the support of the Dunne board and the occasional 
support of Progressive reformers, hampered the efforts of the administra­
tive progressives to secure centralization through administrative fiat and 
blocked passage of legislation imposing centralization. In the long run, 
the coalition proved unable to prevent the triumph of centralization.
Its failure strikingly illustrates the character of progressive reform and 
the larger social processes associated with America’s Great Transformation 
that shaped the reform movement. Essentially the failure of the CTF and 
its allies does not so much reflect the inevitable triumph of an organiza­
tional imperative as it does the greater political, ideological, and industrial 
resources of the administrative progressives, the impact of on-going pro­
cesses of class formation and reformation, and the transformation of pub­
lic education into a labor market institution. The Loeb Rule destroyed the 
CTF as an industrial force, while the slow accretion of centralized power 
under Andrews and Cooley and the Otis Bill doomed the vision of decen­
tralized power and professional autonomy that the leadership of the CTF 
supported. In a sense the imposition of a hierarchical and centralized 
system of educational governance, the bureaucratic rationalization of ped­
agogical practices, and the day-by-day control of teachers through “close 
supervision” constituted an educational version of the shift from formal 
to real subordination characteristic of corporate industry. At the same time 
the clash between the CTF and the administrative progressives reflected 
the impact of processes of class formation and contributed to them in 
turn. On the one hand, administrative progressives aspired to advance the 
claims of meritocratic expertise as a legitimate source of social authority, 
to proselytize on behalf of social efficiency, institutionalize a hierarchical 
structure of social relations and administrative arrangements within public- 
education, and create an occupation at once lucrative and prestigious. 
Their successes in this enterprise contributed to the making of a nascent 
professional middle class. On the other hand, the political conflicts asso­
ciated with centralization at first advanced the making of a radical work­
ing-class organization practicing a politics of reform unionism. Later, the 
Loeb Rule, the changing social composition of the teaching force, and the
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successful redesign of administrative arrangements within public educa­
tion stopped this process of working-class formation dead in its tracks. In 
effect, the CTF appears to have been both a product and a victim of 
processes of class formation.
Finally, the victory of centralization is closely related to the transfor­
mation of public education into a labor market institution. Because the 
CTF and organized labor opposed not only the Harper Bill but also the 
Cooley Bill, not merely the imposition of a corporate model of educational 
administration and the formal control of public education by businessmen 
but the stratification of the currieulum under the aegis of social efficiency, 
opposition to the CTF and support for centralization came to be closely 
connected, in terms of ideology and personnel, with the drive to vocation- 
alize and differentiate public education. In short, centralization consoli­
dated business control of the board of education, transformed the 
administration of the school system along corporate lines, and advanced 
the transformation of public education into an adjunct of the market 
economy. In the last analysis, the defeat of the CTF symbolized the 
triumph of one form of social organization over another: the imposition 
of hierarchical social relations and centralized, corporate, and bureaueratic 
structures of control on a public institution against the wishes of a radical 
reformationist movement protesting the subordination of public educa­
tion to the imperious demands of the market and advocating nothing 
more revolutionary than democracy in education and an education for 
democracy.
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